The Role of Representatives of Minority Shareholders in the System of Corporate Governance
Due to the global influence of the shareholder-centered model of the US, both China and the EU have taken more measures to protect minority shareholders. In this respect, the representation of minority shareholders on the board, in particular the system of cumulative voting which was originally designed by the US to protect minority shareholders, has become a frequently-discussed issue in China and the EU. This study of comparative law is based upon the comparison of the attitudes among the US, China and the EU towards cumulative voting. By analyzing some empirical investigations and massive literatures of American academics as the theoretical foundation, it tries to demonstrate whether the convergence of corporate governance towards the shareholder-centered model is inevitable.
Wenjia Yan studied Law and was awarded an LL.M. at the China University of Political Science and Law, Peking, and an LL.D. at the Faculty of Law of the University of Hamburg. Her research interests include Corporate Governance as well as Comparative Law.
