Costs and Incentive Effects of Stock Option Repricing
ISBN:
978-3-631-52401-5
Verlag:
Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften
Land des Verlags:
Deutschland
Erscheinungsdatum:
01.04.2004
Reihe:
Europäische Hochschulschriften / European University Studies / Publications Universitaires Européennes
Format:
Softcover
Lieferung in 3-4 Werktagen
Versandkostenfrei ab 40 Euro in Österreich
Does repricing of executive stock options, i.e. the practice of lowering the exercise price when options are out-of-the-money unfairly reward managers for poor performance and thereby undermine incentives set by the compensation contract? In a study that compares the pay package containing repriced option with an otherwise adjusted package it is shown that repricing is not more expensive to shareholders than otherwise adjusting non-option compensation components. However, the package containing repriced options provides significantly stronger incentives. Furthermore, a policy that constrains the board of directors from repricing does not have significant effects on shareholders’ returns.
An analysis of current and future electricity production from biogas in Germany
Erscheinungsjahr:
2023
