Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
ISBN:
978-3-642-35821-0
Auflage:
2013
Verlag:
Springer Berlin
Land des Verlags:
Deutschland
Erscheinungsdatum:
13.04.2013
Reihe:
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Format:
Softcover
Seitenanzahl:
168
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A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
Schlagwörter
Biografische Anmerkung
Demet Çetiner worked as research assistant at the University of
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.
