The German Federal Commissioner
Scholars have described the delegation of power from politics to administration with the help of the principal-agent theory. This framework examines challenges in the constellation of a superior, i.e. principal, and their subordinate, i.e. agent. Recruitment is a major way in which political power can be delegated to the administration. However, it is unclear how constellations in which the agent is a hybrid between politics and administration are to be assessed. Germany is familiar with the hybrid institution of the German Federal Commissioner (GFC), uniting elements of both politics and administration. GFCs or ‘Bundesbeauftragte’ are formally not part of ministerial hierarchy, nor of the cabinet. Also, their constitutional position is blurred because many of them hold simultaneous posts within in the legislative. For this hybrid institution, the delegation mechanisms are unclear, especially in recruitment. This contradicts the fact that GFCs are of high public interest; in its first official act, the new German Merz government abolished half of all GFCs. The present study attempts to get to the bottom GFC recruitment by applying them to the principal-agent framework.
Daniel Jochum conducts research at the interface between political and administrative science, in particular on the recruitment of top officials. He pursued his academic career at the Universities of Konstanz and Havana, SciencesPo Paris, King's College London and the Hertie School in Berlin.
